Plumpy’Nut, Part 4: What do we really know?

“Perhaps Nutriset could have saved more lives by freeing the license on Plumpy’Nut. But how does one actually measure something like this? Is it even true?”

It makes sense to look at patent disasters from the point of view of “accident investigations”. Trying to assign blame makes no sense; it is more important to figure out what went wrong, how, and why; and even more importantly, what could be done to prevent scenarios like this in the future, if they need to be prevented.

The case of Plumpy’Nut (see web page) has been covered in earlier postings.  Almost everyone who has commented on the case has held that the patent system is broken. Perhaps. But just how is it broken? Continue reading Plumpy’Nut, Part 4: What do we really know?

Plumpy’Nut, part 3: What could a truly evil company do?

The hard facts of Case Plumpy’Nut have been given in Part 1 and Part 2. Now is the time to speculate. If someone wanted to be truly evil with this patent, could they start a “Kill the Children” campaign, as I have outlined in Trolling on the Human Rights?

This is clearly a patent that has the potential to be truly dangerous in the wrong hands. However, whatever bad press Nutriset has gotten, it is not causing the maximal damage that such a patent would allow.

Nor is it the only player on this field;  even a very quick Google search brings up patents and applications which on the face of it don’t seem to differ that much from the Plumpy’Nut. (See for example 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,…). All of these products are however slightly inferior to Plumpy’Nut in some way, so that Plumpy’Nut is optimized for famine relief.

Consider now a different scenario. Suppose Nutriset was not producing Plumpy’Nut anymore, but instead had sold the patent to a non-practicing entity X.  (Non-practicing entity NPE is a polite term for “patent troll”)

Continue reading Plumpy’Nut, part 3: What could a truly evil company do?

Plumpy’Nut, part 2: The ethics

The basic facts of the Plumpy’Nut case were shown in the previous part.  It sounds controversial, but what is intriguing about this case is that things could be significantly worse. Compared to the extremes that the law would allow it to do, Nutriset is behaving somewhat decently.

Continue reading Plumpy’Nut, part 2: The ethics

Plumpy’Nut, Part 1: The basic facts

Can something as trivial as peanut butter be patented, and the patent used to hinder famine relief efforts? Yes.

I have been updating some IPR-related post of mine from way back in 2012 to see whether anything has changed. Not much, it seems. IPR is an obscure and ethically complex area, but in some cases fascinating in a fairly perverse way.

I find that Plumpy’Nut is the most fascinating of them all. It sounds like a case of a evil guy profiting from starving people… yet in fact it is not so simple at all. This is a series in multiple parts, and each part goes deeper and deeper into the technical details — and also bewilderment.  In the end, I have no idea what the ethics of the Plumpy’Nut case are.

Continue reading Plumpy’Nut, Part 1: The basic facts

Ultra-low-tech lightning detection: business aspects

 

Part 2 of write-up on ultra-low-cost lightning detection network. See Part 1 for background.

[By Jakke Mäkelä and Niko Porjo]

This part summarizes the cost and business case estimates made for the project. The analysis suggests that an extremely low cost might be possible, making the solution suitable for use even in developing countries like Sri Lanka. However, we could not find a way to motivate anyone to fund the R&D part. Thus, we are not pursuing this further for the time being.

BUSINESS ASPECTS

Business case: both hardware cost and data transmission costs are kept so low that building and maintaining network is realistic to perform as a public service. Data transfer can be made over mobile phone network (SMS, GPRS, 3G…) or landline if available. Multiple operators are made to compete to keep data costs down. Hazard indication to end users will need to be wireless to achieve real-time warning.

Benefits

•An exact business case is difficult to determine, as it is for any lightning warning system.

•Situation in Sri Lanka: Tens of deaths reported annually, real number of deaths and injuries unknown. Commercial detection systems too expensive to maintain.

Costs

•Absolute worst-case scenario: If SMS sent less than once per min, reliability of network becomes poor. Thus cannot transfer much less than this. During storms, whole network would need to be transmitting 60*60=3600 SMS/hour. In Finland,  cost of SMS on one operator is ~5 cent, so cost would be 180 EUR/hr for whole network. Assuming 6 hours/ day of storms in active seasons, would mean 30 kEUR/month, which is of course completely unacceptable. But in practice, there are fixed-cost deals available from operators. Multiple operators are absolutely needed in order to maximize price competition and minimize risk of monopoly pricing. But there are SMS-based systems in existence which are affordable (for example Nokia Life Tools http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nokia_Life_Tools) which means that costs could be kept reasonable if there is political push.

•Transfer rate over GPRS, if available, is even in extreme case ~160 B/min or 1kB/hour per station.  For total network, transfer is ~60 kB/hour. Per month, amounts to ~100 MB. On one Finnish operator, GPRS cost can be ~1.5 EUR/MB, so cost would be <200 EUR/month. Clearly GPRS would be the preferable channel where available.

Costs

•Sensors need to be stockpiled to allow them to be replaced quickly if needed, so at least 100 need to be built. Smaller calibration networks can also be developed in parallel and run in a suitable country.

•Main components are radio receiver, GPS clock, GSM/GPRS, processing unit. Battery may be most expensive individual component. ideally will run on AC power, but need to have backup battery/UPS capable of multi-hour operation in case of power failure.  Unit cost of 400EUR should definitely be reachable (cost of full network 40kEUR), though profit margin to manufacturer is then low. This part may need to be subsidized.

•Setting up of network is low-cost since all sensors are autonomous and operate by wireless network. Slow deployment is possible.

•Central unit can be a tabletop PC. Redundancy and power supply needs will increase cost significantly, but main algorithm is simple.

•Operating costs can be minimal if GPRS can be used.

•Cost of transmitting hazard information to users via Cell Broadcast is largest open question.

Funding and implementation

•No funding has been found.

•The organization Geoscientists Without Borders has been funding projects which are similar to the proposal: http://www.seg.org/web/foundation/programs/geoscientists-without-borders

•The target of the pilot is to improve local R&D competence in Sri Lanka, but kicking off the project could require an investment that is difficult to find locally. National foreign aid organizations (Finland or Sweden) might be approached for projects of this type, especially if some of the testing can be done in Europe (enhancing local knowledge also).

Similar projects

•Lots of small semi-official warning systems are known to exist, but limited info in public domain. Data transfer is almost always by fixed-line Internet, which can be unreliable especially in developing countries. Mobile wireless networks have better reliability (though not perfect).

FINAL OUTCOME

We continue to think that the idea would work in principle, but there is no real way to make it successful commercially. We need to feed our families, and cannot do it.

If someone is interested in making this a non-profit open-source project, the crucial documentation is already in the public domain and just needs to be collated together. There are some major engineering issues to be solved, but if profitability is not a requirement, they are likely to be solvable.

 

 

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