Is aviation safety a shameful thing?

 

“Why do airlines stay so silent about safety issues? “

By almost any measure, flying is the safest way to move long distances. Most airlines make massive investments into safety. Yet to our surprise, we have found that it is difficult for a casual outsider to find out precisely what the airlines are doing with that invested money.  All airlines have a safety culture, yet this culture is opaque to outsiders. I found that only 35% of airlines even wish to mention safety on their web pages.

Silence certainly does not benefit the customers of an airline. Customers should be able to make informed choices, and this includes understanding the safety record. How can the average person find such information? It  doesn’t benefit the airlines either. In a culture of silence, safety only becomes visible when disaster strikes. The easiest way for an outsider to understand the airline’s safety culture is to read accident investigation reports on how it failed (from NTSBAAIBOTKESSHKBEA, and the like). This is hardly positive advertising.

I asked a simple question: just how opaque do the airlines want to be?  To answer, I went clicking through the web pages of 83 major airlines. The scanning was purposely quick, to simulate an ordinary customer who wants to know what general attitude the airline has toward safety. If a company provided concrete safety information, it was marked as “safety-positive”. Full report (pdf): Airlines are safe; why try to hide it.

I found only 35% of airlines to be safety-positive. To put it another way,  almost 65% of airlines try to downplay the role of safety, to the level of ignoring the question altogether in their communications.

I made some further analyses to determine what might lie behind this fact.  It is important to realize that the essential safety standards around the world are quite similar. All of the airlines in this sample fulfill some standards that could be legitimately used to show that there is a safety culture in place. It is very much a communications decision whether or not the airline wishes to emphasize this point.

I gave the benefit of the doubt as much as possible.  A sentence on a “safety as our priority” means nothing. However, any attempt at a more concrete desciption (even a clumsy one)  was credited. Information on engineering, maintenance, or safety-related technology was considered safety-positive even if the term “safety” was not used explicitly. Such information at least gives the impression that aviation is a technical activity requiring technical care. The analysis is not about how slick the presentation is; it is about whether a good-faith attempt is made.

This is crucial when comparing airline to airline. A poor airline may have just one page of information about the company. If that single page contains a single paragraph about the safety standards that the company follows, then the airline is safety-positive. At the other extreme, a large airline may have dozens of flashy pages on issues like corporate social responsibility, environment, and sponsorships. If such a company fails to even mention safety as a topic, it is deliberate.

The call was surprisingly easy to make. Airlines seem to either put a heavy emphasis on safety, or else avoid the topic altogether; there is not much middle ground.  The results were somewhat surprising. Only 35% of airlines even mentioned safety or technical issues. The majority essentially try to paint an image of aviation as a non-technical activity that entails no risk. Some other key findings (more extensively discussed in the report):


  • 65% of the safety-positive airlines are from developing countries with poor track records of safety. Africa and the former Soviet Union were heavily represented.  Quite clearly, concrete safety actions are clearly used to to improve trust in the airline’s safety.
  • Safety-positiveness is not just a “weapon of the weak”; large and successful airlines such as British Airways, Air Canada, Air Berlin, and All Nippon Airways all had extensive safety sections.
  • Two airlines, Garuda Indonesia and Pakistan International Airways, have briefly been on the EU blacklist of airlines banned from flying to the EU due to poor security. Interestingly, the safety sections of these airlines were among the most extensive in the sample.
  • Only 2 low-cost carriers out of 16 (12%) were safety-positive. The web page information for many low-cost carriers is extremely scanty in any case, so there may be a general attitude toward minimal communication. However, the two counterexamples (Norwegian and Pegasus) suggest that a low-cost structure does not fundamentally require such reticence; those two companies have a very strong focus on safety.
  • A striking feature is that US companies seem to be the most averse to safety-positiveness; of the 9 US companies studied, none mentioned safety at all.
  • A similar reluctance was seen in Middle Eastern companies, where only one of six companies had any safety information.

These results do not imply anything about what airlines should do; they simply point out what the airlines are currently doing. However, the scatter in the results does suggest that there is no fundamental reason to keep safety information hidden; transparency about safety is a communications and business decision.

Since the results from this initial study were so intriguing, we have launched a new Zygomatica project to find out more.

Data transparency as a safety feature

 

It seems to me that situational awareness of cruise ship passengers is not considered important, I have a problem with that. It is perfectly clear that going on a cruise means an increased level of risk. The risk is larger during a storm than it is during calm summer weather. Passengers need truthful information about the service they are purchasing. Informed choices can’t be made without adequate information. I therefore suggest that the amount of safety-related information available to passengers should be significantly increased.

A good place to start is history (examples here are from Finland as this text is a translation of a Finnish original). In 2005, there was a fire on board the M/S Amorella, the crew extinguished it with firm professionalism. For some reason, there was no press release nor were the shareholders informed through a stock exchange release. The situation on board the ship was over at 22.59, at which point the passengers were allowed back inside. There was a stock exchange release by Viking Line next morning at 09.00, dealing with the rising cost of fuel. Yet there was a fire, it was extinguished, and as always in situations like this, something was learned. In this case the investigation resulted in five recommendations which should have raised discussion among the professionals. To be credible when talking about safety history should be visible, smaller and larger mistakes should be acknowledged, and above all the company should show what was learned and how it is showing up in the everyday activities. To be fair to the Viking Line company, it is not alone in its  amnesia; the Silja Line history shows no memory of this steering-loss incident in 1995, nor does the Tallink history remember this attempt to widen the route near Kustaanmiekka. But there is an amusing mention of how the trade in duty free beer is really picking up.

I made a quick search of the www.costacruise.com web site to see what they tell about safety. Nothing much. The only reference I could find related to occupational safety. From the aviation world, searching www.finnair.com or www.lufthansa.com sites produced little of note either. There was slightly more information on the Viking Line web pages. The page could be found by searching for “safety” in the search field. Safety information on the Tallink Silja web pages was more difficult to find and scantier. Personally, I found the lengthier information on the Viking web pages more reassuring, a sign that safety is being taken seriously.

This situation is slightly strange. At least in the case of airlines, safety work is a significant effort and a never-ending process. One would imagine that the same applies to cruise ships. In both cases, it is next to impossible for a customer to check the real situation. Are the companies afraid of losing customers? Maybe. This could certainly happen if the message is ham-fisted: “If our service fails, you can die”. However, by using some money one can buy a presentation that brings out the facts in a more neutral way. At the same time best experts on aviation or maritime safety are likely to be found outside the companies themselves. If safety thinking is opened up on the Internet, it would be possible to draw in researchers essentially for free to comment on weaknesses. A “no communication” model eliminates this possibility.

Safety must be priority number one in all shipping, especially passenger ships. This should be visible in the organization all the way to the top. The board of directors should include a person with a publicly stated overall responsibility for safety. That person should have sufficient experience and clout to actively question weaknesses in the procedures.

At the other end, the safety organization and procedures should be opened to the passengers at all levels. Let us take the concrete example of a fire which requires evacuation. Should those partying in the disco go to their cabins to get warm clothing? This is an important question, since even an hour of waiting in the cold without adequate clothing can seriously hinder a passenger’s ability to act, and can endanger the evacuation process. Perhaps there are procedures for this, but how are we to know this? We cannot know, since we have not been given any information on what kinds of plans the ship’s crew has.

Locations of ships can be seen here and sea ice conditions can be seen here, weather forecasts can be found here. There is plenty of information on parameters that affect the speed, comfort, and safety of the trip. If the shipping company adds information on the ship’s performance and safety, such as any hazardous substances, narrows on the navigation path, navigational information such as a radar picture, and information from the fire warning system, passengers would have almost the same information as the crew on the bridge. By adding information that normally interests the passengers, such as the opening times of the buffet and an opportunity to reserve seats there, there is enough information to create a mobile application that anyone travelling with a smartphone would want to have available.

Detailed information may not interest everyone, but based on this information it is possible to create an index showing the current safety situation. Currently a large part of the problem is the coarse-grained approach, in which there are just two modes: 1) keep on partying, 2) we are in major trouble. Modern technology and enlightened customers would enable much more fine-grained communication.

An application like this would require a mobile device compatible wireless network that operates inside the ship. When such a network exists, it can also be used to transmit emergency information to the passengers. The report on the Isabella accident of 2001 showed problems when dealing with a multilingual environment.  As soon as instructions had been given in Finnish, the clamor level rose, making it difficult to hear announcements made in other languages. In such circumstances, it would be beneficial to have the information available in written form, in multiple languages. Some people may also find it easier to follow written instructions rather than trying to listen to spoken instructions.

I would distribute almost all of the information in the ship’s systems both inside and outside the ship in a standardized format that allows third-party use and would allow the authorities to maintain real-time situational awareness. Due both to long distances and difficult conditions, it can take hours for help to arrive. Proactive reaction to developing incidents can thus significantly alter the outcome. A culture that values autonomy and self-sufficiency above all must be changed. When and where possible self-sufficiency should be the goal, but in case of a deviation from normal one should prepare, automatically, for the need to receive external assistance by communicating all relevant information .

At some point increasing safety will be limited by rising costs. I would like to see analyses in which these limits are challenged. Estimate the cost of a shipboard Wi-Fi system, balance the cost against the advantages, and make a decision based on this balance. It may be necessary to keep some calculations as trade secrets, but even there it is worthwhile to truly analyze what needs to be secret and what does not.

A functioning safety culture requires acceptance of the fact that mistakes will be made and they must be learned from. However, it is impossible for external parties to assess quality of the safety culture if no information on that culture is openly available.Data transparency  as a safety feature

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